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INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the water industry of England and Wales passed
from public to priv ate ownership. During the 1970s and
1980s the publicly owned water authorities suffered from
under investment to the extent that aging pipes leaked and
polluting discharges into the rivers and sea, and out-ofdate and overloaded waste water treatment works were
commonplace. Capital investment was dependent upon
central government funding and the indu stry was alw ays a
prime target for government cutbacks; there being no votes
in new sewers, compared to for example, new schools. The
Conservative Government (1979-97) was a great believer
in private ownership and during its eighteen year reign
many state assets passed to the private sector as prime
minister Thatcher sought to roll ba ck the frontiers of the
state by creating a share owning d emo cracy.

companies (supply only) were unaffected. The new water
authorities were based on river catchment areas and they
had control over the water cycle from source to sea,
including water supply, sewerage, flood prevention, river
quality and sludge disposal. Such a structure allowed the
water authorities to plan at a strategic level and better
utilise water resources. The new European Water
Directive (consultation draft issued in 19 96) will instruct
all Euro pean countries to p lan and mana ge their
catchments on this basis, so in many ways England and
W ales (such a re-organisation did not take place in
Scotland) were ahead of the times. What could not have
been foreseen however, was that such a re-organisation, by
greatly reducing the number of water and sewerage
undertakings, would ease the path to privatisation some
fifteen years later.

Apart from some concerted efforts on leakage control in
the 1980s the water industry has traditionally favoured a
supp ly led approach to water resources mana gement. It is
only in the last few years that demand management has
gained credence as a potential solution to keeping supp ly
and demand in balance, primarily due to regulatory
pressure, the growing awareness of environmental issues
and the droughts of 1989-92 and 1995-96.

In 1989 the water authorities were privatised and renamed
water companies. The total assets of the authorities
(including reservoirs, pum ping stations, treatment work s,
offices etc.) in addition to the management of those assets
all passed into p rivate owne rship m aking this privatisation
unique in com pariso n with other countries.
T he
Governm ent ensured that share sales were a huge success
with the British public because they were guaranteed a
quick return on their investment. It has been estimated
that the net proceeds of the sale were £3.6 billion for
assets estimated to be worth £34.5 billion (with the
taxpa yer picking up the cheque for the difference)
[HMSO, 1992-93]. However, because water and sewerage
services are essentially a monopoly there had to be
regulation to protect the interests of consumers and the
enviro nment.

This paper sets out some of the consequences of
privatising the water industry in England and W ales and
discusses whether privatisation has been an advantage or
disadvantage, in relation to the management of water
demand.

BACKGROUND
A Local Government and water industry re-organisation in
1974 replaced the 10 0 water bo ards, 5 0 local council
undertakings, 27 river authorities, 2 river conservancies,
1366 council sewerage undertakings and 7 joint sewerage
undertakers with 10 regional water authorities in England
and W ales. The thirty small and historically private water

THE REGULATORS
The water ind ustry of E ngland and W ales is arguably one
of the most heavily regulated industries in the world.
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The Secretary of State for the Department of the
Environm ent, Transport and the Regions is responsible for
the regulatory framework for the water industry of
England and W ales. There are two ma in regulators:

metered households has risen from 2 .6 percent in 1 992 to
9.2 percent in 1998).
THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATISATION
FOR DEMAND MANAGEM ENT

The Office of W ater Se rvices (Ofwat) - whose role is to
ensure that the functions of a water company are properly
financed and carried out.

The N umber’s Game and Restructuring
From 1991 to 1997 o n average, the water companies have
reduced their staffing levels from 46,436 to 37,379 a
reduction of around 2 0 percent. In som e com panies this
reduction has been more severe, where up to 40 percent
reductions have occurred (Water Service Assoc., 1991).
The main driver for this has been the need to improve the
com pany’s performance indicators, many of which have
number of emplo yees as their denominator. The water
companies would argue that this does not imply any loss
of service since the former jobs of these employees are
‘outsourced ’. In many cases this has been accompanied by
a loss of expertise and focus as the following exam ple
illustrates.

The Environment Agency (‘the Agency’) - is responsible
for the provision of water resources and the protection and
enhancem ent of the natural environment.

THE REGULA TORY AG ENDA AND WATER
RESOURC ES

There has been a water abstraction licensing system in
England and Wales since 1965. O ne of the problems with
the catchment based water authorities was that they were
in the position of adjudicating on their own licence
applications, i.e. they were both poacher and gam ekeeper.
This manifested itself in o ther ways; they had pow ers to
prosecute polluters, but rarely did so because the worst
polluters were them selves.

There is no history of water conservation in the UK,
primarily beca use our appliances have alwa ys been to
some extent ‘efficient’ (by U S stand ards). Mains leakage,
due to aging systems dating from the industrial revolution,
however was rec ognise d as a problem. In the 19 80s with
system leakage at around 30 percent or higher many water
authorities started to address the pro blem by better
monitoring and employing inspectors to find leaks. As
privatisation approached staff employed on leakage
control were easy targets for the next round of job cuts, as
the consequences of such actions would no t be felt
imme diately; a case of classic short-termism.
Unsurprisingly, continual reductions in staffing levels and
uncertainty over the future have severe ly affected morale
in the water com panies.

The Environment Agency, with a duty to conserve,
redistrib ute or otherwise augment water reso urces and to
secure the proper use of those resources is now the
independent abstraction licensing authority (HMSO,
1991). This gives the A gency the po wer to refuse
applications for new resources if it considers that there has
been insufficient progress in managing demand. The
Agency is also in the process of agreeing to a water
resources plan with each water company. Prior to 1989,
oppos ition to new water resourc e schemes was left
principally to well organised environmental pressure
groups. The Agency, in seeking to strike a balance
between the needs of the environment and the abstractor,
currently believes that far more cou ld and should be done
to manage existing demands.

Much of this has been allied to restructuring in the water
companies to yield ‘business efficiencies’. Often this has
resulted in staff being even more remote from the
communities they serve. This is particularly important in
relation to water conservation activity, where a good
relationship with the community is considered a prerequisite for success.

The Office of W ater Se rvices agrees to the price limits of
water companies and protects consumer interests. To
achieve this they are looking to the water companies to be
more economical and efficient in ca rrying out their
functions. Ofwat wants to see the least-cost option
adopte d by the water companies in maintaining the
balance betwe en sup ply and demand, with an expectation
that the demand management options will receive a
thorough consideration. In particular Ofwat has been a
strong advocate of metering households (the proportion of

The Financial Profit Motive
A private company’s first duty is to pro vide its
shareholders with a financial return. Although companies
may talk about their ‘stakeholders’ (shareholders,
customers, community and environment) the reality is that
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the shareholders are the main concern. Ideally the
financial profit motive would be aligned with the best
interests of the four stakeholders. Evidence to the fact that
this alignment has not taken place is the detailed and
frequent regulatory intervention into water company
activities.
This is not entirely the fault of water
comp anies.
The current regulatory regime, allows
companies to increase their charges by RPI +/- K where
RPI is the Retail Price Index and K is a capital allowance
determined by investment need. In the case of wa ter
resource investment, assuming the water company can
convince Ofwat of the need for a new water resource
development, this is “allowed for” in K and the company
is guaranteed a rate of return on that investment. The
alternative to water resource development, demand
management and water conservation, does not receive the
same consideration. The situation at present is that the
cost of meter installations may be ‘awarded’ in K (to be
determined later this year) but it is expected that any other
water conservatio n activity will have to be financed from
the company’s revenue. There is no financial incentive
for the water companies to actively manage their demand.
So it seems reasonable to co nclude that what is argua bly
in the best interests of three of the stakeholders
(com munity, customers, and environment) is in direct
conflict with the interests of the most important
stakeholder, the shareholders.

beauracratic and inefficient, and a place where a job was
‘for life’. Despite the success of the share sale the British
peo ple have d ifficulty accepting the conc ept of profit
being made out of collecting and distributing water. Since
privatisation, year-on-year water company profits have
soared, as have executive salaries. The greater dividends
paid to shareholders seem to be at the expense of
operational maintenance, particularly leaka ge co ntrol in
the early years. The pub lic resents this primarily because
they see the water industry as a monopoly not subje ct to
normal business risk. The consequence of this has been a
deteriorating relationship (although this is variable across
the companies) between company and customer.
Nowhere was this better illustrated than in the drought of
1995. Yorkshire W ater, from b eing initially co mplacent,
found their water resources being rapidly depleted in the
western part of their service area . Requests by the
company to conserve water were ignored by an angry
pub lic who believed the situation was caused not by the
weather but by management ineptitud e. Suggestions that
the public might have to face rota-cuts were m et with
outrage and employees were adv ised no t to go in public
places wearing uniform for fear of being attacked.
Eventually York shire W ater ruled out rota-cuts as an
acceptable optio n, and maintained the supply by using 700
road tankers to transfer water to an empty reservoir
(Independent Com mission of Inquiry, 1996).

This dilemma is recognised by Mark Clifton writing in the
water industry’s weekly maga zine, Water (Clifton, 1997):

There is a feeling that generally the public are less
prepared to respond to reduce water use and are not so
accepting of restrictions (e.g. hosepipe bans) in dro ughts.
In part this is due to the fact that bills have risen (to pay
for the under investment of the past) faster than inflation
and the public’s expectations of the service they receive
have risen. T hey are no lon ger prepared to accept the
inefficiency expected of a public service.

Since companies have a duty to promote water efficiency
to all their custom ers, it would be inapp ropriate to subject
them to a price co ntrol th at ga ve them incentives to
expand dem and . In other regulated industries, how ever,
price control formulae have bee n deliberately modified to
give companies a positive incentive to reduce demand.
For example, in electricity and gas, some price controls
have been changed from controls on the average revenue
per unit of energ y sup plied to controls o n total revenue.
Once reven ue is fixed, such com panies can increase
profits by reducing demand (and hence costs). Given
stronger incentives through the price con trol form ula to
reduce demand, water companies may be more willing to
press ahead with seasonal tariffs and other innovative
ideas sought b y Ofwat.

Some of the wa ter compa nies view this change in
perception as the call to build in large margins of supply
over demand. They believe that all forms of restriction
should be avoided, because this is what the customer
expects. In 1997, the Managing Director of Severn Trent
W ater stated (Duckwo rth, 1997):
I’m not here today to advocate hosepipe ban s. Inde ed, I
have been saying for over two yea rs that such a term
should be banned from our dictionaries and no company
should ever, in the future, have to resort to such a
measure. We a re all in the customer service business and
none of our customers want bans…W e are in the water
supply business - not in the w ate r re stric tion business….

Customer Relations and Public Perception
The public water authorities were not loved, but neither
were they particularly disliked. They were seen as
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We know what our c ustom ers wa nt an d I be lieve w e are in
the business to give them what they need, whenever they
need it.

to the lack of resentment, but it is easy to imagine them
developing a paternalistic approach. Such an approach
would not be acceptable under the current privatised
regime: companies and their customers need and are
seeking a more balanced relationship.

As a result, the water companies have b een extremely
unco mfortable with the idea of working with their
customers in finding a solution to the supply-demand
problem that does not involve the provision of additional
resources. The following two comments are representative
of many of the water companies views on the idea of
entering the customer’s home to carry out water
conservation audits and retrofits:

Regulatory P ressure s - All Sticks and N o Carrots

The consensus view held by water conservation
professiona ls seems to be that a combination of carrots and
sticks will work best (with custo mers) in attempting to
achieve a conservation goal. This philosophy of approach
is not apparent in the regulatory regime where it might be
surmised that the same combination would be the most
successful in directing water companies towards water
conservation optio ns. It has already been mentioned that
the regulatory regime offers very little in the way of
financial incentives for water companies to pursue the
demand management options. There may be an absence
of carrots, but there has b een no sho rtage of sticks:

The adoption of a retrofitting policy would be promoting
a policy of en forcement and confrontation with our
custom ers [National River Authority (1997)] (Thames
W ater).
We are keen to encourage the voluntary adoption by
custom ers of more efficient washing ma chines, low flush
WC’s and other water saving devices. But a more proactive approach , as is ad opted in p arts of A merica, is
probab ly too intrusive for our cu stomers [Derwent, 1996]
(Southern Wa ter).
However, in recent years more progressive companies
have been conducting pilot studies of water conservation
programs to assess costs and water savings of different
appro aches. Almost without excep tion the respo nse to
these studies has been positive, with willingness to
participate as high from unmetered as metered customers,
so financial savings are clearly not the only incentive.
This is beginning to be recognised by the water companies
themselves:

•

In 1991 and 1993 O fwat set out that their vision of
charging was one where customers would pay the full
econom ic cost of the water they use. Although Ofwat
could not enforce this it was clear that they would look
unfavo urably on co mpa nies with little or no interest in
metering [O ffice of W ater Se rvices (199 1, 19 93)];

•

In 1992 the National Rivers Authority (a predecessor
body to the Environment Agency) declared that
abstraction licenses would not be granted for new
sources unless adeq uate consideration had been given
to leakage control and metering (National Rivers
Authority, 1992);

•

In 1994 the National Rivers Authority set out a vision
of demand m anagement being a key component of its
National W ater Resources Strategy (National Rivers
Authority, 1994);

•

In 1995 the com panies were given a duty to pro mote
water efficiency on behalf of their customers – this has
manifested itself in a water efficiency plan tha t had to
be submitted to Ofwat. Progress against the plan is
checked annually (HMS O, 1995 );

Custom ers are asking us to help them save water, and this
is a challenge for us, the wa ter industry is not used to
dealing with people’s behavioural changes [Smith, 1998]
(Anglian Water).
W ater conservation programs are an opportunity for the
water companies to build bridges with their customers and
enhance their public relations image and environmental
credentials in the process. Far from it being a po licy of
con frontation, it is the author’s contention that water
conservation programs provide an op en door to better
customer re lations.
It is interesting to speculate on how water conservation
programs would have fared under the previous public
ownership regime. It is probable that the authorities would
have been more willing to approach their customers, due
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•

In 1997 the new Labour G overnment, within three
weeks of taking office held a water summit declaring,
amongst other things, that (Environm ent Agency,
1997):

S
S

S

Competition
Although water supply is a natural monopo ly, which in the
absence of true com petition requires an economic
regulator, it is likely that there will be increasingly more
opportunities for competition in the future. The reasoning
is that compe tition will bring efficiency and as a result
reduce costs for the customer. At pre sent co mpe tition
takes two forms with a third under consideration:

water companies will be given mandatory leakage
targets
water companies will offer a free supply pipe
leakage detec tion and rep air service for their
customers
water companies must carry out with vigour,
imagination and enthusiasm their water efficiency
duty

a) Comparative Competition
Ofwat publishes ‘league tables’ of companies based on
particular aspects of performance. For example,
properties experiencing low pressure, speed of
response to written comp laints and leakage levels.
Climbing up the league table is good for the company
image, both as perceived by the City and the customer.

This approach has to some extent been successful. In the
five years from 1994 to 1998 , the threat of and then the
targets themselves have been largely responsible for a
reduction in leakage from 5,112 cubic meters per day
(m 3/day) in 1994/95 to 3,981 m3/day in 1997/98 (Office of
W ater Service, 199 6/97 - 199 7/98 ). In addition regulatory
pressure and persuasive and coherent argument has been
helpful in starting to change the culture in water
companies to take water conservation seriously. However,
the water efficiency plans both in content and action have
been somewhat disappointing. For most companies the
following represent the sum total of the content: leakage
control, metering, toilet cistern displacement devices and
leaflets. Noticeably absent in most plans is innovative
thinking; the approach to the plan does not seem to be
“what can we achieve in terms of water saving?”, but
“what is the minimum that we have to do to keep the
regulators off our backs”. It is the author’s contention that
the regulatory regime, if it wants to encourage cost
effective water conservation and demand management
policies, needs to find a more b alanced ap proach with
respect to carrots and sticks.

b) Inset Appo intments
For large users (using more than 250 m 3/year) it is now
possible for a third party to purchase water supply or
sewerage services from the existing (incumbent) water
company at a discount for onward sale to the
customer. For the inset ap pointee and the custo mer to
generate profit from this arrangement it is strongly in
their interests to minimise the demand for water and
sewerage.
It would appear that this represents an opportunity for
water conservation. However, the threat of such
app ointments has resulted in water companies
reducing their tariffs (rates) for their large custome rs.
Twenty-two of the twenty-seven water companies now
offer declining block tariffs to large users. Thackray
(Environment Agency, 1999) estimated that the use of
these tariffs could be leading to an increase of between
0 and 15 p ercen t in non-household dem and. The
experience from the similarly p rivatised energy
industry provides a reminder of the dangers of falling
prices due to competition where by 1996, gas use had
increased by 22 percent and electricity by 4 percent
due to falling prices (Warren, 1996 ).

Transparency
A by-product of regulation has been transpare ncy.
Considerable amounts of data now enter the public
domain, such as leakage figures, per capita consumption
figures, demand forecasts, numbe rs of meters installed so
it is possible for anyone to monitor demand trends for any
com pany. Most of these data are published annually in
Ofwat’s Report on Leakage and Water Efficiency based
upon the mandatory July return all com panies make to
Ofwat. Opening up the industry to public scrutiny has
been a very healthy development (Office of Water Service,
1996/97 -1997/98).

c) Comm on Carriage (under consideration)
Already in place in the gas and electricity industries
“common carriage” is the shared use of the existing
pipe network. This arrangement would give the
customer a choice of supplier, without having to
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physically move to another com pany’s supply
network. Those with an available supply of water
would have the opportunity to offer that water to
customers currently served by o ther sup pliers. In 1996
the Department of the Environment issued a
consultation paper and as yet there has been no
movement to translate the principle into practical
proposals (Department of Environment, 1996). The
threat to water resources is clearly a lowering of the
water price (where that price bears no relationship to
the value of the resourc e) with a conseq uent increase
in demand.

in. As a result the quality and quantity of debate about the
appropriateness of different options is reduced.

Another less noticed effect of the competitive environment
has been the reduced collaboration between water
comp anies. Original research is now something ‘to sell’
not ‘to share’ and this has been prevalent in the pilot water
conservation study work that some companies are engaged

It is notable that the list of statements in the ‘Helped’
column does not necessarily requ ire a privatised regime,
but in England and Wales they have been an important
consequence of that regime.

SUMM ARY: PRIV ATISATION - A HELP OR
HINDRANCE IN MANAGING WATER DEMAND?
As a summary of the previous discussion, the table below
expresses the author’s opinion on what has helped and
what has hindered (or is likely to in future) the cause of
water dem and mana gement in relation to p rivatisation of
the water industry in England and W ales.

Helped

Hindered

Strong regulatory environment (sticks)
Better accountability of roles between regulated better
division and regulator
Transparency of information
Comp arative competition (league tables of leakage
perfo rmance, pe r capita consump tion etc.)

Lack of regulatory incentive (carrots)
Short term and narrow financial thinking
Manp ower reductions
Public antagonism towards companies
Remoteness from customers, geographically
politically
Inset ap pointments
Comm on carriage

and

forced demand man agement onto the agendas of water
comp anies.
The separation between water service
operations and environmental/economic regulation has
brought considerable clarity to balancing supply and
demand in an environmentally sustainable manner.

CONCLUSIONS
The water companies are characterised by short-term
thinking, prefer the large reservoir so lution (with a
guaranteed rate of return) and are disliked by their
customers thus making partnership difficult. Further
competition will result in a lower price for water ensuring
that payback periods for water conservation measures
lengthen to the extent that they may be shelved. The
privatisation of forme r pub lic service assets into
shareholder ownership has introduced fina ncial
motivation, which does not coincide particularly well with
the wider social and environmental objectives.

Neve rtheless, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that on
balance, privatisation and the accompanying regulatory
framework has no t been of ove rall benefit in attemp ting to
move England and W ales tow ards a more sustaina ble
water resources policy.
Short Term Remedies

Howeve r, there is little do ubt that the strong regulatory
environment has stopped, in its tracks, the traditional
‘predict and provide’ approac h, and by doing so has

The author concludes that there are three necessary steps
needed to ensure an environmentally sustainable water
resources policy in the short to medium term:
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1.

Adjust the econo mic regulation so that water
companies are allowed to include the cost of water
conservation measures in price limits (if
demonstrably cost effective compared to the
alternatives). The regulation should also consider
rewarding companies that produce “negalitres” (i.e.
save water).

2.

If competition is to proceed along the common
carriage/inset appointment route it is essential that the
full econ omic cost of water is charged to the
customer (as stated in the draft European Water
Directive). This means whatever the water company
is able to reduce, it’s (financial) price to a surcharge
would have to remain covering the environmental and
social costs related to the abstraction and use of that
water.

3.

much more d ynamism than the p re-1989 water autho rities)
which should bring a greater degree of accountability.
The Utilities would then no longer be motivated by
financial profit, but instead have as a mission statement the
need to practice sustainable water mana gement, providing
the tools and advice for their customers to use water
acco rdingly. In many households, the water m eters so
badly needed in the short to medium term, would no
longer be required to act as blunt eco nomic instrume nts,
but as measuring devices to extend the public’s motivation
far beyond saving money to living an environmentally
sustainable lifestyle.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author
and not those of the Environment Agency.

The water companies need to de-centralise their
operations in an attempt to build local partnerships
with their customers. By reducing leakage they have,
to some extent, got their own house in order, now
making collaborative water conservation approaches
possible.
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